Pete Moleton v. Union Pacific Railroad Company and Pacific Fruit Express Company : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1949
Pete Moleton v. Union Pacific Railroad Company
and Pacific Fruit Express Company : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Rawlings, Wallace, Black & Roberts; Wayne L. Black; Dwight L. King; Counsel for Plaintiff and
Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Moleton v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., No. 7379 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1167
Case No. 7379 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PETE MOLETON, 
Plciintiff and .Appellant, 
vs. ~~.1'TLv 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD'"'- .•t tf.J I 
.COMPANY, a corporation, and PA- ~, r-" -: .... ,•f'l 
CIFIC FRUIT EXPRESS COM- ~ ~~·J 
P ANY, a corporation, ·---- ·~- .. -~ . .: .... 
e £ftK, SUPREME-COURt,----ut··H 
DefMt-dants ood Respondents. " 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
BLACK & ROBERTS 
WAYNE L. BLACK 
DWIGHT L. KING 
Counsel for 
Ptaifn.ti f! if1IYUl .A ppellam,t 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX TO BRIEF 
Page 
Subject Index 
PRELIMIN"ARY STATEMENT ---------------------------------------------------------··········· 1 
STATKMENT OF THE CASE 6 
(a) The Laramie Yards -------------------------------------------·---------------------- 6 
(b) The Conduct of Business in Those Yards ---···------------------------ 7 
(c) The Plaintiff's Employment ---------------------------------------------------··· 12 
(d) The Event of Plaintiff's Injuries ----------------------------------··-···-··· 13 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS -------------------------------------------------------------------- 20 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ································------··--------···-------····--···· 21 
ARGUMENT --·-·······················-············-······················································ 22 
POINT I. THE PLAINTIFF, WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE 
F. E. L. A., WAS EMPLOYED BY THE DEFEND-
ANT, UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, 
WIITCH ADMITTEDLY WAS ENGAGED AS A COM-
MON CARRIER BY RAILROAD IN INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE .................................................................. 22 
POINT ll. THE ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY DEFENDANT 
RAILROAD COMPANY SEEKS TO HAVE EM-
PLOYEES OF THE EXPRESS COMPANY AND NOT 
ITS OWN EMPLOYEES PERFORM NECESSARY 
SERVICES ON ITS INTERSTATE TRAINS AND 
CARS IS A CONTRACT OR DEVICE IN VIOLA-
TION OF 45 U.S.C.A., SECTION 55 ............................ 49 
POINT ill. THE DEFENDANT EXPRESS COMPANY AT THE 
TIME OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES WAS A COM-
MON CARRIER BY RAILROAD IN INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE .................................................................. 54 
POINT IV. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE INTRO-
DUCED IN TillS CASE TO SUPPORT A FIND-
ING THAT THE DEFENDANTS WERE NEGLI-
GENT AND THAT SUCH NEGUGENCE CONTRI-
BUTED IN WHOLE OR IN PART TO THE INJUR-
IES SUFFERED BY PLAINTIFF···········--·--··--······-·-····· 55 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 59 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX (Continued) 
CASES CITED 
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Tredway's Adm'x., 120 Va. 735 
93 S.E. 560, 10 A.L.R. 1411 (writ of cert. den. 2·45 U.S. 
Page 
670, 38 S. Ct. 191, 62 L. Ed. 540) .................................................. 35 
Bailey v. Central Vermont R. Co., 319 U.S. 350, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 
87 L. Ed. 1444 ----------·---------------------------------------------------------------------------· 58 
Chicago R. 1 & P. Ry. Co. v. Norman, 165 Okla. 133, 25 P. 2d 298 ____ 35 
Cimorelli v. New York Cent. R. Co., 148 F. 2d 575 -----------------------·------ 37 
Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., 69 S. Ct. 275 --------------------------------·------- 58 
Denton v. Yazoo & M.V.R. Co., 284 U.S. 305, 52 S. Ct.141 ____________________ 33 
Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R. R. Corp., 4 Mete. 49, 38 Am. 
Dec. 339 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------·--- 26 
Gaulden v. Southern Pac. Co., 78 F. Supp. 651, affirmed without 
opinion 17 4 F. 2d 1022 --------------------·-----------------------------------------------.47, 52 
Harrell v. Atlas Portland Cement Co., 250 F. 83·--------·----------------------·--· .. -- 36 
Hull v. Philadelphia & Reading Railway Co., 252 U.S. 475, 40 
S. Ct. 358, 64 L. Ed. 670 --------------------------------------------------------------26, 28 
Jones v. George F. Getty Oil Co., 92 F. 2d 255 ·----------.. ·-··----------·----··----- 30 
Lavender v. Kurn, 326 U.S. 713, 6·6 S. Ct. 740, 90 Adv. Ops. L. 
Ed. 692 --------------------------------------·------------------------------------------------------------ 58 
Linstead v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 276 U.S. 28, 48 S. Ct. 241, 
72 L. Ed. 453 --------------------·------------------------------··---------------------------------25, 28 
Lovett v. Calloway, 69 F. 2d 532 -------------------------------------·------------------------ 35 
McLamb v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours, 79 F. 2d 966 ---------·--·------------------- 36 
Murray v. Wasatch Grading Co., 73 Utah 430, 274 P. 940 -------------------- 36 
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Barlion, 172 F. 2d 710 ----------------------------------···-37, 45 
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Roth, 163 F. 2d 161 --·------------------------------------·-·37, 42 
Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co. v. Schubert, 224 U.S. 603, 32 S. Ct. 
589, 56 L. Ed. 911 -----------------------------------------------------------------------·-------· 53 
Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215, 29 S. Ct. 252, 53 L. 
Ed. 480 -----------------------------------------------·-------------------------------------------------- 26 
Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 64 S. Ct. 409, 88 L. 
Ed. 520 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------.. ---- 58 
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 
87 L. Ed. 610 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------·------- 58 
Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 187 P. 2d 188, 69 S. Ct. 29, 69 S. Ct. 413........ 58 
STATUTES 
45 U.S.C.A., Sec. 55 ·-----------·-------·------·---------·----------·------------------------------------- 50 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PETE MOLETON, 
Plaiintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a corporation, and P A-
CIFIC FRUIT EXPRESS COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Defendants arnd Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Case No. 
7379 
In this brief we shall designate the parties as they 
appear in the trial court. 
All italics appearing in the brief are added. 
'The figures in parentheses refer to the pages of the 
record. 
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The defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company, 
will be referred to herein as the railroad company and 
the defendant, Pacific Fruit Expres.s Company, will 
be referred to as the express company. 
This is an appeal by plaintiff from a judgment (R. 
66), entered in favor of the defendants, and each of them, 
and against the plaintiff "No Cause for Action." This 
judgment was entered upon the court granting the de-
fendants' motion for nonsuit and for the dismissal 
of plaintiff's complaint, which motion.s were made after 
the plaintiff had rested (R. 267 -277). This action was 
brought by plaintiff to recover the sum of $100,000.00 for 
permanent injuries received by plaintiff while work-
ing in the yards of the defendant, Union Pacific Rail-
road Company, at Laramie, Wyoming on the 22nd day 
of November, 1945. 
The complaint in this case was divided into three 
causes of action. Each cause of action set forth a sep-
arate and distinct theory upon which plaintiff claimed 
that he could recover for the permanent injuries which 
he had suffered (R. 1-18). 
The first cau.se of action is founded upon the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act and the plaintiff therein 
alleges that the two defendants are common carriers by 
railroad in interstate commerce and that plaintiff was 
employed by them in such commerce. 
The second cause of action is against the express 
company alone. This cause of action is divided into two 
counts. Plaintiff alleged in each count that he was em-
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ployed by said express company. Under the first count 
the plaintiff alleges that the defendant is engaged in 
operating a railroad within the State of Wyoming as 
a common enterprise with the Union Pacific Railroad 
Company. Plaintiff under this count relies upon the 
statutes of the State of Wyoming which applies to rail-
road companies operated within the State of Wyoming 
(R. 9-11). This act is very similar to the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act. 
In answer to this first count of the second cause of 
action the defendantB deny that the express company op-
erates a railroad within the State of Wyoming and hence 
does not come within the said statutes (R. 30-31). 
The second count of the second cause of action is 
based upon the theory that the express company had 
failed to comply with the statutes of the state of Wyo-
ming requiring the contribution by employers to the 
Industrial Accident Fund. Under the statutes of Wyo-
ming Buch failure permits the employees of such em-
ployer to maintain their common law actions for in-
juries (R. 11-12). 
In answer to this second count the defendants denied 
that the express company was subject to the Workman's 
Compensation Act of Wyoming, relying upon Section 
72-105 of the Wyoming Compiled Statutes 1945, wherein 
it is provided that the Wyoming Compensation laws do 
not apply to businesses or employment which, according 
to law, are engaged in interstate commerce (R. 31, 47-49). 
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The third cause of action is against the railroad 
company and is based upon the theory that the relation-
ship of employer and employee does not exist between the 
plaintiff and the railroad company and that plaintiff 
suffered his injuries by reason of the negligence of the 
railroad company (R. 13-16). 
The negligence set forth in the various causes of ac-
tion contained in the complaint are almost identical. 
Under the first cause of action plaintiff alleges that 
he was employed by the defendants as an iceman and in 
the performance of his duties in the wintertime was 
1 equired to descend into bunkers on refrigerator cars 
to regulate burning heaters whirh generated carbon mon-
oxide gas. He further alleges that this gas accumulated 
and was known to accumulate by defendants in these 
bunkers, making it extremely hazardous to him in the 
performance of his duties. He alleges that they failed 
to use reasonable care to furnish him a reasonably 
safe place to work in that this condition existed in the 
bunkers, and that the defendants neglected to provide 
any means of removing and discharging the carbon mon-
oxide gas. Plaintiff further contends that the defen-
dants were negligent in not providing any methods or 
means whereby plaintiff could be saved or rescued by 
the peril created by the presence of said gas, and the 
defendants failed to provide a sufficie~t crew to assist 
in the performance of these hazardous duties. Plain-
tiff further relied upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
These grounds of negligence are realleged in the 
second cause of action. 
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In the third cause of action plaintiff alleges that 
the railroad, knowing that carbon monoxide gas had 
nccumulated in the refrigerator cars and knowing of 
its dangerous characteristics, negligently instructed 
plaintiff to adjust the heaters therein without help or 
essistance and without providing means whereby plain-
tiff could be saved or rescued from said gas and with-
out warning plaintiff of the presence of said gas. 
It was further alleged that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur applied and that the defendant, knowing of 
the presence of the carbon monoxide gas in the bunkers 
and that plaintiff would be unable to discover its pres-
ence, the railroad company negligently neglected to give 
plaintiff warning of the ·existence of the said gas and the 
hazard thereby created, and the railroad company ne-
glected to ventilate said car or provide mean.s for the 
removal of said gas (R.14-16). 
·The defendants denied all of the acts of negligence 
and in their answer alleged as affirmative defenses 
contributory negligence, assumption of risk and the fel-
low servant doctrine. 
We have set out the pleadings to inform the court of 
the various issues which were involved before the trial 
court. However, on this appeal we are only interested 
in the first cause of action. We have set forth the alle-
gations of the second and third causes of action so that 
the court may be informed of the position taken by the 
parties with respect to these two causes of action. It 
is to be noted that the defendants contend that the plain-
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tiff is entitled to no form of compensation for the in-
juries which he has received. By their position in this 
case they reflect the extent to which they claim they have 
insulated themselves against liability for injuries to em-
ployees working on trains in interstate commerce. 
We feel that our position on the first cause of action 
is well taken and that it is unnecessary to belabor the 
points raised in the second and third causes of action on 
this appeal. 
STATEl\IENT OF THE CASE 
In setting out the statement of facts, we shall divide 
it into four classifications, to wit: (a) The Laramie 
Yards; (b) The conduct of business in those yards; (c) 
The plaintiff's employment; (d) The event of plain-
tiff's injuries. The trial court in granting the motions 
for nonsuit did not specify the grounds upon which they 
were granted. Although the record does not show it, 
~rguments and discussion on the motions were devoted 
almost entirely to whether or not the Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act was applicable to this case. 
(a) THE LARAMIE YARDS 
The Laramie Yards, in which plaintiff was injured 
on November 22, 1945, are approximately two miles 
long and two blocks wide. The railroad company owns all 
of the tracks in this yard and is the only railroad that 
transports trains or cars either into or out of these yards 
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(R. 21~, 213). These trains contain cars from many dif-
ferent railroads (R. 213). 
Laramie is a terminal and all engines are changed 
in thes·e yards, that is, when a train comes into the yard 
the engine is disconnected from the train and replaced 
by a fresh engine (R. 235 ). When these trains arrive 
there is generally quite a bit of work to do on them and 
in some instances they are completely broken up and 
remade before they proceed on their journey (R. 234). 
The yard at Laramie is also a regular inspection 
point (R. 221) and cars containing perishable produce 
and commodities are serviced by icing and regulating 
heaters and ventilators (R. 214). This perishable freight 
consists of such items as fresh meat, sweet potatoes, 
spuds, beer, wines and grapefruit (R. 213). 
(b) THE CONDUCT OF BUSINESS IN THOSE YARDS 
A Yard Office is maintained in these Laramie Yards 
by the railroad company and into which comes all infor-
mation concerning trains coming into the yard. This 
information is made available to all persons who may 
have work to do on the train so that they may know 
what work must be done before the train proceeds on 
its journey. This work consists of switching operations 
(R.- 235) and also the inspection and regulation of heat-
ers on refrigerator cars (R. 214). 
The information concerning· a train is received at 
the yard office about an hour before the train arrives 
in order that preparations may be made for the work 
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to be done and the train may proceed on its jori.rney with-
out undue delay ( R. 230). 
The procedure by which this 'information i.s for-
warded to the yard office was described in the testi-
mony. Trains proceeding toward· the Laramie Yards 
would be in charge of the conductor who would have the 
waybills on the various cars and freight contained there-
in. From these waybills he would make up a switch list 
(R. 230). A copy of the switch list of the train involved 
in this case was introduced in evidence as defendant 'a 
Exhibit "5". A perusal of the switch list will show the 
type of information accumulated by the conductor in 
making up this list. The number of each car and the 
company owning it was listed, the class of freight, the 
contents of ·each car and its destination was aloo placed 
on this list. The waybill instructions were given and par-
ticularly instructions were given concerning the perish-
able freight. It being wintertime, when the train in-
volved . in this case approached Laramie the directions 
. for this perishable freight concerned the temperature 
at which these cars must be kept to prevent :freezing 
of the freight contained therein. 
This switch list, after its preparation, is dropped 
off by the conductor at. some telegraph station along 
the line. The dispatcher at the station then forwards this 
information, either by telegraph or telephone, to the 
yard office at Laramie. In the yard office is made up 
a consist from the information so obtained from the 
conductor. Enough copies of this are made for all per-
sons who may have work to do on the train. The con-
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sists are then. hung on a tab in the office to be picked up 
by the various persons concerned with getting the train 
in readiness for its journey. All of the persons who 
have anything to do with the making up and forwarding 
of this information are persons in the general employ of 
the railroad company ( R. 230, 231). 
In the yard office the railroad company employs a 
yardmaster. From the information, forwarded to the 
yard office, he determines how he is going to make up 
and break up the train. He in turn· gives this infor-
mation to the yardmen and to the· switchmen (R. 230, 
231). 
The expreos company has a couple of desks in the 
yard office and persons in the general employ of the 
express company in the yard office obtain a copy of these 
consists just as does the railroad company • yardmaster 
(R. 231). The parties stipulated that a copy of Exhibit 
"5" was furnished by the railroad company to the 
express company yard clerk in the yards at Laramie 
on the occaoion of the arrival of· the train involved in 
this case. This exhibit was then furnished to the per-
sons working in the yard under the general employ of the 
express company in order that they could perform their 
work on the train (R. 233). 
The yardmaster would determine from the informa-
tion he received where the trains coming into Laramie 
would be stopped and on what tracks and he in turn 
. would inform the express company general employees 
what tracks were clear and on what tracks he intended 
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to put the trains (R. 234). The yardma.ster would leave 
a list similar to Exhibit '' 5'' on the caboose for the men 
on the switch engine working at the rear end of the 
train so that these men would know what work was to 
be done on that end of the train (R. 234). It was the 
yardmaster's responsibility to carry out the necessary 
things which were required by the information contained 
en the switch list. It was also the responsibility of the 
express company to take care of the work to be done 
on the refrigerator cars as disclosed by the information 
contained on this list (R. 245). 
The foreman of the express company receives his 
information as to what should be done on the cars over 
the phone from the yard office. The foreman by those 
directions is told at what temperature the heaters are to 
be lighted or the temperature at which the heaters are 
to be extinguished (R. 215, 220, 221). The foreman has 
r.:.othing to do with where the trains are placed in the 
yard and has nothing to do with the time that these 
trains come into or leave the yards (R. 215). 
These refrigerator cars are owned by various com-
panies, including the Pacific Fruit Express, the Swift 
Company, the Armour Company, the Rath, and the Cana-
dian Pacific (R. 221). The general employees of the 
express company perform the necessary work on all of 
these refrigerator cars in the railroad company's trains 
regardless of what company owns them. It should be 
noted that the car from which plaintiff fell and was in-
jured was not a car owned by the Pacific Fruit Express 
(R. 126, 127). 
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The work of the plaintiff and others in the general 
employ of the express company was gone into much more 
in detail than the work performed by the general em-
ployees of the railroad company. This was natural be-
cause plaintiff was injured while in the performance 
of his dutie.s in regulating the heaters on the refrigerator 
cars. 
It appeared from the evidence that when the fore-
man obtained the necessary information he would then 
direct plaintiff and other employees of the express com-
pany what was to be done on the refrigerator cars and 
gave them the numbers of the cars on which this work 
was to be done. He also informed them of the track 
on which the train was to be placed and the time of 
its arrival. 
A rule had been promulgated and was posted in 
the yards by the express company. The so-called ''Safety 
First Rules" were introduced in evidence as defendant's 
Exhibit "4". Rule 19 d. provided: 
''When inspecting cars or lighting heaters 
at regular inspection points, not less than two 
employees must work together for each other's 
protection.'' 
This rule, requiring two employees to work together in 
the adjusting of heater.s, was usually followed in the 
yards (R. 218). 
It was stipulated by the parties that the express 
~ompany was a Utah corporation, organized in 1906 
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and that with the exception of a relatively small number 
of shares the stock of the express company was owned 
in equal amounts by the defendants Union Pacific Rail-
road Company and the Southern Pacific Company. 
It was further stipulated that no members of the Board 
of Directors of either the Southern Pacific Company or 
the Union Pacific Railroad Company were members of 
the Board of Directors of the express company. 
It was also stipulated that the express company per-
forms the same or similar services for at least four rail-
roads, to-wit: The Southern Pacific, The Union Pacific, 
The Western Pacific and the Mexican railroad (R. 266-
267). However, it was also stipulated that this was not 
true in the yards of the railroad company located in 
Laramie, Wyoming ( R. 267). The evidence conclusively 
establishes that the only services rendered by the ex-
press company nominal employees was to the defendant, 
Union Pacific Railroad Company. 
(c) THE PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYMENT 
At the time of receiving his injuries plaintiff was 
in the general employment of the express company (R. 
141). He had worked for them since 1925 (R. 72). He 
was not on the payroll of the railroad company and he 
received his check from the express company. If there 
had been occasion to fire him it would have been done 
by the express company (R.141, 142). 
The foreman of the express company told him 
·what work to do (R. 143). In performing the work on 
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13 
the heater cars the men on the job determined whether 
or not charcoal was to be placed therein and how much 
(R. 146). On occasions plaintiff would determine whether 
the bunker walls should be adjusted (R. 148). Plaintiff 
also determined how long he would leave a plug out be-
fore he climbed into the bunker (R.149). 
It appears that the directions given plaintiff were 
from information and instruction.:; given to the express 
company by the railroad company and obtained by that 
company from the waybills on the various cars and 
freight in the train. This information was accumulated 
by the railroad company's conductor and placed on a 
switch list which eventually came into the hands of all 
persons who worked on the train, whether nominally em-
ployed by the express company or the railroad company. 
(d) THE EVENT OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES 
Plaintiff was injured on the 22nd day of November, 
1945, at which time he was 53 years of a_ge. At that time 
he had worked for the Pacific Fruit Express for more 
than twenty years; during this time his duties had been 
to take care of the inspection and handling of refriger-
r.tor cars. In the summertime he iced these refrigerator 
cars and in the wintertime he took care of the heaters 
(R. 73, 74). 
Pictures of one of these refrigerator cars wa.s in-
troduced in evidence as defendants' Exhibits '' 1'' and 
"3". These cars are about 15 or 16 feet from the top 
of the rail to the top of the car (R. 75); from the floor 
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to the ceiling is from 8 to 10 feet; the car is about 10 feet 
wide (R. 75); the cars have an ice bunker in each end. 
These bunkers are about 3 feet to 3% feet wide. The 
bottom of these. bunkers, or the floor, is made of tin or 
steel. The bunkers are separated from the rest of the 
cars by either wood or steel partitions (R. 78). To get 
into the bunkers the men climb a ladder on the side of 
the car to the top of the car and open the door or plug 
of the bunker. The men then climb down the ladder 
on the inside of the bunker to the floor (R. 81). 
In the summertime the cars were brought to the 
icing docks and ice and salt placed in the bunkers (R. 
82). In the winter months plaintiff's work consisted of 
regulating the heaters by either putting charcoal in them 
or by shutting them off, as the weather required (R. 90). 
On occasions it was necessary to place ice in cars which 
contained meat (R. 91). Plaintiff, in the performance 
of his duties, worked on refrigerator cars owned by vari-
ous companies including the Fruit Growers' Express and 
the American Refrigerator Company (R. 92). During 
the wintertime the plaintiff at all times worked with two 
men and sometimes with three (R. 92). His foreman 
would tell him on which track the train was located. 
In describing the way the work was usually done 
the plaintiff testified that at least two men were supposed 
to perform the duties of regulating the heaters in the 
bunkers (R. 96). After climbing to the top of the car 
one of the plugs is opened by the use of a pick handle; 
after the plug is open one of the men descends into the 
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bunker and either shuts off the heater or puts more 
eharcoal into it; the other man goes on to the next bunker 
and performs the same dutie-s. Plaintiff testified that 
sometimes he noticed that there was gas in the bunkers. 
He determined the presence of gas by the fact that he 
would get dizzy, not while he was down in the bunker, 
but as soon as he got out into the fresh air (R. 93-96). 
On the day that the plaintiff was injured he arrived 
at work at 8:00 o'clock in the morning. At that time 
there were four men working, plaintiff, the foreman and 
two other men. On this particular day, Riley was the 
foreman. In the testimony of the plaintiff, this man 
i.5 referred to as Rowley (R. 97). During the morning 
the plaintiff did not work on any of the refrigerator cars, 
but as he remembered it, he did some cleaning up in the 
yards. Shortly before noon a westbound train con-
sisting of 50 or 60 cars pulled into the yards at Laramie. 
It pulled in on Track No. 10 (R. 99, 100). Just before 
the train arrived plaintiff and the foreman were the only 
men on duty, the other two men having gone to dinner at 
about 11 :30. The foreman told plaintiff to work on this 
train and that there were three reefers, which is the name 
that the men give to these refrigerator cars. He was told 
that there were three heater-s which he was to regulate 
by shutting them off (R. 101, 102, 150) and he was given 
the numbers of the cars (R. 104). Because plaintiff 
would have to walk about a half a mile to the point where 
he was to perform his duties, he started for Track No. 
10 before the train arrived (R. 101, 103). The reefers 
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on which plaintiff was to work were at the head end 
of the train, which would be the west end. Plaintiff 
started walking along the track toward the west (R. 
104) and the foreman remained in the shanty (R. 152, 
153). Plaintiff went alone to regulate these heaters 
(R. 105). 
When he arrived at the first car upon which he was 
to work he climbed up on top of that car by means of 
the south ladder (R. 132) and opened the plug. He 
then proceeded to the other two car3 opening the plug 
on each. In performing this work he walke·d along 
the top of the cars and did not dismount. He opened 
all of the plugs before he entered the bunkers in order 
to let the carbon monoxide gas out which had been 
generated by the burning heaters (R. 193). Plaintiff 
estimated that it took him about four minutes to open 
these plugs and return to the first car on which he had 
opened the plug (R. 199). 
After returning to this first car he descended by 
means of the ladder and shut off the burning heater 
(R. 204). He climbed out of the bunker and proceeded 
on to the second car. He descended into the bunker, shut 
off the heater, climbed out and proceeded on to the third 
car. He estimated that the plug in the third car had 
been open between ten and twelve minutes (R. 200). 
He climbed down the ladder in this car, shut off the 
heater, and then climbed out by means of the ladder. 
When he got into the fresh air he lost consciousness and 
this is the last that he remembers until he came to lying 
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on the ground near the car from which he had fallen 
(R. 106-109). 
Plaintiff did not know the name of the car or its 
number: he did know, however, that it was the reefer 
at the head end of the train. It was stipulated that the 
car from which plaintiff fell was F.D.E.X. 9084 (R. 126, 
127). This car was the second car from the head end (R. 
129). It was a car of the Fruit Growers Express and not 
of the defendant express company (See Exhibit "1"). 
Plaintiff testified that he remembered coming out of 
the bunker on this car and that he remembered putting 
the plug in place but that he did not remember anything 
after that (R. 110). He fixed the time at which he fell 
off the car at about five minutes to twelve (R. 112). 
Plaintiff testified that he knew that the safe way 
is to open the plugs on both ends so the gas can get 
out and there is ventilation through the car, and he 
stated that he didn't do it on this occasion because the 
train was in a hurry and the foreman had so told him 
(R. 193). Plaintiff, in answering the question as to why 
he did not open all of those plugs, testified as follows 
(R. 206): 
''A. This foreman told me this train been sup-
posed to stay· about five or six minutes in 
the yard, and he call 'hot shot', you know, got 
to go quick. He told me how much, you can 
quick open up one plug, that is plenty, this 
foreman told me. 
Q. He did~ 
A. Yes. 
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Q. What do they mean, it was a 'hot shot'? 
A. Sometimes, you know, this train like some-
time coming one train, two train, they have 
stock, and they have got to get out of town. 
Q. He told you that? 
A. Yes.'' 
!a 
It also appeared that the rear end plugs on at least 
two of the cars were sealed and plaintiff could not re- ,,. 
member as to the third car (R. 205, 206). Plaintiff had _ 
not received orders from his foreman permitting him 
to break the seals (R. 205) and in the absence of such 
order he could not break the ·.seals (R. 223). 
Syler, a foreman for the Pacific Fruit Express 
Company and who had worked on the refrigerator cars ~ 
containin_g these charcoal burners since 1929, testified 
that the burning heaters created and caused gas fumes 
within the bunkers (R. 215). It was stipulated by the 
parties that the gas which was created or formed in 
the bunkers wa.s carbon monoxide gas (R. 216). Syler 
testified that he had seen fellows getting headaches 
from this gas and that they had a "bad feeling" after 
working too many of these cars (R. 216). 
A person is affected by these gas fumes more after 
he has been in the car and has ·come out into the fresh 
air. This gas doe.s not have an odor and it cannot be 
seen (R. 219). 
For protection of the men from these fumes Safety 
Rule 19 d. requiring two men to work together had 
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been promulgated and had been in force in the Laramie 
Yards since 1929 (R. 218, 219). 
Plaintiff testified that sometimes he was able to 
tell whether or not there was gas in the bunker and at 
other times that he ·was not able to tell (R. 112). On 
the occasion of his injury he testified that he figured 
that the gas ·was out of the bunkers because he had 
opened up the three plugs as above indicated. He was 
not dizzy while he was working on either of the first 
two cars. As he came out of the bunker on the third car 
- he felt the same as he did at any other time. He testified 
- that he had to bend a little bit when he shut the plug 
and that when he raised up that is the last he remembered 
(R. 113, 114) and at that time he fell from the car. 
When he regained consciousness he was suffering from 
"plenty pain". He testified that the pain was in his 
right hip, that three ribs were broken and that he was 
skinned on one side. He laid on the ground for two hours 
before he was taken to the hospital at Laramie (R. 114, 
140). 
Plaintiff then testified to the treatment which he 
received at the hospital, the fact that he was placed in 
a cast, and the misery and pain which this treatment 
caused him to suffer. He also testified that he was re-
quired to return to hospitals several times and that 
various -doctors treated him. These matters are of no 
importance on this appeal other than to indicate that 
- the plaintiff did suffer severe and permanent injuries 
and suffered severe pain. 
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 
Comes now the plaintiff and appellant in the above-
entitled action and assigns the following errors com-
mitted by the trial court and upon which he relies for 
a reversal of the judgment entered against him: 
1. The trial court erred in granting a motion for 
a nonsuit as to plaintiff's first cause of action made by 
the defendant and respondent, Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, and entering a judgment pursuant thereto 
dismissing plaintiff's cam:;e of action. (See Points I, 
II and IV of this brief). 
2. The trial court erred in granting a motion for 
a nonsuit as to plaintiff's first cause of action made by 
the defendant and respondent, Pacific Fruit Express 
Company, and entering a judgment pursuant thereto dis-
missing plaintiff's cause of action. (See Pointa III and 
IV of this brief). 
3. The trial court erred in granting the motion 
for a nonsuit upon the first count of the plaintiff's sec-
ond cause of action, said motion being made by the de-
fendant, Pacific Fruit E~press Company, and in enter-
ing the judgment dismissing plaintiff's action. 
4. The trial court erred in granting the motion for 
a nonsuit on the second count of the plaintiff's second 
cause of action, said motion being made by the defend-
ant, Pacific Fruit Express Company, and in entering 
judgment dismissing plaintiff's action. 
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5. The trial court erred in g-ranting the motion for 
a nonsuit on plaintiff's third cause of action made by 
the defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company, and 
entering judgment dismissing plaintiff's action. 
SU~Il\:fARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PLAINTIFF, WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE 
F.E.L.A., WAS EMPLOYED BY THE DEFENDANT, UNION 
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, WHICH ADMITTEDLY 
WAS ENGAGED AS A COMMON CARRIER BY RAILROAD 
·IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE. 
POINT II. 
THE ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY DEFENDANT RAIL-
ROAD COMPANY SEEKS TO HAVE EMPLOYEES OF THE 
EXPRESS COMPANY AND NOT ITS OWN EMPLOYEES 
PERFORM NECESSARY SERVICES ON ITS INTERSTATE 
TRAINS AND CARS IS A CONTRACT OR DEVICE IN VIO-
LATION OF 45 U.S.C.A., SECTION 55. 
POINT III. 
THE DEFENDANT EXPRESS COMPANY AT THE TIME 
OF PLAINTIFF'S IN JURIES WAS A COMMON CARRIER 
BY RAILROAD IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE. 
POINT IV. 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE INTRODUCED 
IN THIS CASE TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE DE-
FENDANTS WERE NEGLIGENT AND THAT SUCH NEGLI-
GENCE CONTRIBUTED IN WHOLE OR IN PART TO THE 
INJURIES SUFFERED BY PLAINTIFF. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PLAINTIFF, WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE 
F'.E.L.A., WAS EMPLOYED BY THE DEFENDANT, UNION 
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, WHICH ADMITTEDLY 
WAS ENGAGED AS A COMMON CARRIER BY RAILROAD 
IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE. 
Whose work was plaintiff performing at the time 
he wa.s injured and during the time he was discharging 
the duties of his employment in the Laramie Yards1 
If plaintiff was performing the work of the rail-
road company then he was in the employ of that com-
pany and this action is properly founded upon the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act. 
The railroad company owned the yard and tracks 
at Laramie. It was the only company which transported 
trains in and out of that yard. The only trains which 
were worked on in those yards were the trains of that 
company. It was the one that determined what time the 
trains should come into the yard and what time they 
should leave. It determined on what tracks the trains 
should be placed and where the work was to be per-
formed. 
What cars and what freight should be brought into 
the yard and what should be done with them was de-
termined by that company. It was the one that deter-
mined the destination of the cars and it was the one that 
gave directions as to the inspection and work which 
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should be performed upon those cars. It was the com-
pany that dealt with the shippers and waybills were 
made out by it. From these waybills and the commodi-
ties carried it determined the temperature at which the 
refrigerator cars were to be transported. 
An examination of Exhibit "5", the switch list, 
discloses the directions it gave for the handling of the 
cars and freight in the Laramie Yard. Based upon the 
information and direction set forth in thia exhibit every 
person working in the yard on this train knew exactly 
what to do in readying this train for its continued inter-
state journey. Everyone working on this train was 
given the very same information regardless of whether 
he was nominally employed by the express company or 
the railroad company. 
The work to be done on these trains consisted princi-
pally of switching, changing engines and servicing cars 
containing perishable freight. The name of the docu-
ment by which the information concerning the train is 
distributed is significant. It is designated: 
''SWITCH LIST AND 
SERVICE INSTRUCTIONS 
PERISHABLE FREIGHT'' 
In the upper right-hand corner is the following: 
''TO AGENT OR INSPECTOR 
Carload Perishable Freight must be serviced in 
accordance with waybill instructions shown be-
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low. Position of ventilators is to be recorded 
under 'Arrival' and 'Departure' columns, show 
'0' for Open, 'C' for Clol3ed." 
Here is a direct instruction to the nominal employees 
of the e:x:press company what they must do to the cars 
in this train of the railroad company. Turning to the 
second page of this exhibit we find the instructions con-
cerning the three cars on which plaintiff worked. They 
are the 2nd, 6th and 7th cars on the train. We are not 
able to decipher exactly what the abreviations mean, 
but the waybill instructions on these cars in the order 
worked by plaintiff are as follows: 
47 CPS Htr 35° above 
47 --- -- 35° 
60 SPS Lt Htrs 15 Ext 20° 
These instructions were interpreted to mean that 
under the conditions at Laramie the heaters in these 
cats were to be extinguished. The employees working 
on the refrigerator cars followed these instructions 
given by the railroad company and the heaters on the 
cars in that company's train were shut off by plaintiff. 
We submit that under these circumstances the work 
being performed by plaintiff was the work of the rail-
road company and was conducted in its yards and on 
cars in its train being transported by it for its shippers 
and the work was done pursuant to specific directions 
and instructions given by it. Plaintiff was therefore 
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its employee in performing its work. This assertion 
is supported by the authorities. 
The case of Linstead r. Chesape·ake & 0. Ry. Co., 
276 U.S. 28, 48 S. Ct. 241, 72 L. Ed. 453 (1928), sustains 
plaintiff's position here. The problem there was the 
same a8 in the case at bar, that is, whether the work-
man involved was an employee of the defendant within 
the meaning of F .E.L.A. The action was brought under 
that statute. 
The plaintiff's deceased was employed as a freight 
conductor by the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. 
Louis Ry. Co., known as the ''Big Four.'' He and the 
other members of his crew were paid by that company 
and they were not subject to discharge by the defendant. 
The Big Four and the defendant were connecting 
carriers. The tracks of the Big Four were west of Cin-
cinnati and the defendant's track8 were east. The east 
end of the defendant's terminal yard was at Stevens, 
Kentuck'Y, some 13 miles east of Cincinnati. The inter-
change of traffic between these two companies was ac-
complished by an arrangement whereby the Big Four 
sent an engine, caboose and train crew over the rails of 
the defendant to Stevens and then picked up and brought 
to Cincinnati cars destined to be tranaported by the Big 
Four west of Cincinnati. Defendant did not pay the 
Big Four for this service, but it sent its engines etc., 
west of Cincinnati on Big Four rails and returned cars 
destined to be transported by it east of Cincinnati. 
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While operating the Big Four train on defendant's 
tracks the crew was under the supervision of defend-
ant's trainmaster and the crew obeyed the signals of the 
defendant's switch tenders and complied with the de-
fendant's operating rules. 
On the morning of the accident, the deceased was 
acting as conductor of the Big Four locomotive and 
caboose. The locomotive and caboose were driven to 
Stevens and there picked up a train of cars containing 
22 loads and 18 empties, and the train was proceeding 
on its way hack to Cincinnati. A passenger train of 
the defendant company collided with the rear end of the 
freight train killing the conductor. The trial court in-
structed the jury that as a matter of law the conductor 
was in the employ of the defendant company within the 
meaning of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Judg~ 
ment was rendered for plaintiff and the Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed on the ground that the conductor was 
not employed by the defendant company, relying on the 
case of Hull v. PhJiladelphia & Reading Railway Co., 252 
U. S. 475, 40 S. Ct. 358, 64 L. Ed. 670 (1920). The Su-
preme Court, however, reversed the circuit court and 
affirmed the district court, holding that the deceased con-
ductor was as matter of law an employee of the de-
fendant company. In reaching this result the Supreme 
Court relied on Stoodard Oil Co. v. A~ders.on, 212 U. K 
215, 29 S. Ct. 252, 53 L. Ed. 480, and the case of Fa.rwell 
v. Boston & WorcestM R. R. Oo'r':p., 4 Mete. 49, 38 Am. 
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Dec. 339. The ba~is for the Supre1ne Court ruling is 
found in the following quotation from the latter case: 
'' * * * To determine whether a given case 
falls within the one class or the other we must 
inquire whose is the work being performed, a 
question which is usually answered by ascertain-
ing who has the power to control and direct the 
servants in the performance of their work. Here 
we must carefully distinguish between authorita-
tive direction and control, and mere suggestion as 
to details or the necessary cooperation, where the 
work furnished is part of a larger undertaking.'' 
The Court, in speaking of the case before it, stated 
as follows: 
''Now the work which was being done here by 
Linstead and his crew was the work of the Chesa-
peake & Olrio Railway. It was the transportation 
of cars, loaded and empty, on the Chesapeake 
& Ohio Railway between Stevens and Cincinnllti. 
It was work for which the Chesapeake & Ohio 
road was paid according to the tariff approved 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission; it was 
work done under the rules adopted by the Chesa-
peake & Ohio Railway Company; and it was done 
under the immediate supervision and direction of 
the trainmaster in charge of the trains running 
from Stevens to Cincinnati, and that trainmaster 
was a superior employee of the Chesapeake & 
Ohio road. We do not think that the fact that the 
Big Four road paid the wages of Linstead and 
his crew, or that they could only be discharged or 
suspended by the Big Four, prevented their being 
the servants of the Chesapeake & Ohio Company 
for the performance of this particular job." 
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The strength of this case as authority in favor of 
the plaintiff in the case at bar is emphasized by a con-
sideration of the case of Hull v. Philadelphia & Readitng 
Ry. Co., supra. In this latter case the plaintiff's de-
ceased was in the employ of Western ~1:aryland Ry. Co., 
as a brakeman and was killed. This company was an 
interstate carrier operating a railway from Hagerstown, 
Md., to Lurgan, Pa., at which point it connected with 
a railway owned and operated by defendant between 
Lurgan and Rutherford, Pa. By arrangement between 
the two companies through freight trains were operated 
from Hagerstown to Rutherford by each of the com-
panies operating its trains over its own tracks and over 
those of the other company, observing the rules of each 
company on its respective lines. It was held that the 
deceased was not a servant of the defendant, by which 
he was killed, but only the servant of the W ~tern Mary-
land Company. 
In distinguishing this case the Court in the Linstead 
case at p. 243 stated : 
'' • • • That was because the work which Hull 
was doing was the work of the Western Mary-
land Company, even though it was carried on for 
a part of the way over the rails of the Philadel-
phia & Reading Company. The locomotive be-
longed to the Western Maryland Company, the 
cars belonged to the Western Maryland Company 
and the loads that were carried were being car-
ried for the Western Maryland Company, and 
presumably the rates which were received for 
the transportation were the receipts of the West-
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ern :Maryland Company. In other words, the 
whole line between Hagerstown and Rutherford 
was exactly as if it had been jointly owned by 
the two companies, and jointly used by them for 
their freight trains. Therefore the work was done 
by the \V estern :Maryland for itself and the mere 
transfer of the train owned by the Western Mary-
land and operated by it on to the rails of the 
Philadelphia & Reading Railway did not trans-
fer the relation of the deceased from the general 
employment of the Western Maryland to a special 
employment by the Philadelphia & Reading as 
another master. 
"In the present case there was such a trans-
fer and the line over which the transportation 
was effected and on which the work of trans-
portation was done by the deceased was the line 
of the Chesapeake & Ohio, which was master and 
remained in charge of the operation, with the 
immediate supervision of the Big Four crew 
which was lent for the very purpose of doing the 
work of the Chesapeake & Ohio.'' 
It is to be noted that in both the Hull and Linstead 
cases the trains were being operated over the rails and 
subject to the rules of the company claimed to be a 
special employer of the deceased person. Different re-
sults were reached in each case. Therefore, we must 
conclude that the factor of rules is not of any great 
weight in a determination of whether the employees of 
the company operating the train become also the em-
ployees of the company over whose tracks the trains are 
being operated. Hence, the determining factor is not 
the control over the employee but is whose work is being 
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done. The case of James v. George F. Getty Oil Co., 
92 F. (2d) 255, decided by the 10th Circuit Court in 
1937, contains an excellent discussion of the federal 
cases concerning the problem under review in the case 
at bar. The court relies principally on the Linstead case, 
supra. 
The plaintiff in the J,ones case was employed by 
one Norwood in Texas to work on certain oil drilling 
operations in New Mexico. The water for this opera-
tion was to be furnished to Norwood by the defendant. 
This water was to come from certain wells on defend-
ant's property. The wells came out of repair and Nor-
wood was prevented from continuing his drilling opera-
tions because there was no other available source for ob-
taining water. Plaintiff, under the direction of Nor-
wood's foreman, went to the property of the defendant 
to assist in repairing the wells. This foreman then di-
rected plaintiff to climb a "gin pole", attach a block 
to the top thereof and feed a pulley through the block. 
Plaintiff was standing near the top of the pole, pursuant 
to the aforesaid order, when a guy wire broke allowing 
the pole to fall, injuring the plaintiff. 
In the performance of this work upon the premises 
of the defendant the plaintiff was acting under the di-
rection, supervision and control of Norwood and Nor-
wood's foreman. The plaintiff was not at any time or 
in any manner acting under the direction, supervision 
or control of the defendant or any of its employees. 
Plaintiff accepted compensation under the Workmen's 
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Coml?ensation lRws from Norwood and this suit was 
brought against the defendant on the theory that he was 
a negligent third party. 
The court held that plaintiff was a special employee 
of the defendant and hence his only remedy was under 
the Ke\Y 1Iexico Con1pensation Act. He could not bring 
his action upon the theory which he had brought it. The 
court pointed out that it frequently appears that a work-
man will be held to have been at the same time the gen-
eral employee of his regular employer and the special 
employee of the person whose work is being done. In 
reaching the result that the plaintiff was an employee of 
defendant, the court at p. 259, stated : 
''The controlling factor is: For whom is the 
work being performed, and who had the power 
to control the work and the employee~ The au-
thority to determine the work to be done, and 
the manner in which it is to be carried on, neces-
sarily includes the right to suspend or terminate 
the work altogether or, possibly, to exclude the 
particular employee from the job, not including 
the right to discharge the employee from the ser-
vice of his general employer (Norwood), nor 
need it include the actual giving of directions to 
the employee in connection with the work he is 
doing. 
"Bill Wood, the foreman, and plaintiff, and 
the other members of Norwood's crew, had volun-
tarily entered upon said premises in said work 
with the consent of said defendant, who was the 
owner and in control, through his lease superin-
tendent, Allen Stewart.'' 
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The court in making application of this fundamental 
principle at p. 263 stated as follows: 
''The ultimate test is: Whose is the work 
being done~ Standard Oil Company v. Anderson, 
supra. In determining whose work is being done, 
the question of the power to control the work is 
of great importance (Standard Oil Company v. 
Anderson, supra), but is not conclusive (Linstead 
v. C. & 0. R. Co.; Hull v. Philadelphia & R. R. 
Co. supra). The identity of the person who, in 
fact, directs the details of the work and gives the 
immediate instructions to the workmen is of com-
paratively small importance, the power of con-
trol referred to being the power to control the 
undertaking as a whole. McLamb v. DuPont Com-
pany, supra; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, supra.'' 
In applying the Linstead authority to this ease and 
in pointing out the similarity, the court at p. 260 stated 
as follows: 
' ' * * * There, as here, the injured person was 
under the general employ of another and was 
merely temporarily doing the work of the defend-
ant. There, as here, the work so being done was 
primarily for the purpose of benefitting the gen-
eral employer. There, as here, no payment to the 
general employer was made or contemplated for 
the doing of the work in question by its employees, 
and no payment of wages to the loaned employee 
was made or contempJated by the company whose 
work he was doing. There, as here, however, the 
work in which the employee was engaged at the 
time of the injury was a part of the defendant's 
regular business. The general power of control 
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and supervision of the work was in the defendant, 
although the injured employee was under the im-
mediate supervision of the general employer and 
was only subject to being discharged by his gen-
eral employer." 
The court, after a discussion of the Linstead and 
HUll cases, supra, at p. 261 concludes as follows: 
"* • * The determining factor, therefore, is 
not the question of control over the employee, 
for that was the same in both cases, but as stated 
in Standard Oil Company v. Anderson, supra, it 
is a question of whose work was being done. In 
the Hull case the plaintiff's intestate was oper-
ating a train of his general employer, pursuant 
to his general employer's obligations with its 
shippers. It was, therefore, his general employ-
er's work which was being done and he was held 
to remain that company's employee. In the Lin-
stead case the plaintiff's intestate, a general 
employee of the Big Four Railroad, was carry-
ing on an operation which the C. & 0. Company 
had undertaken to perform. The work he was 
performing was therefore the work of the C. & 0. 
and the court held that in so doing he became 
that company's special employee." 
Another case of the Supreme Court of the United 
States which upholds plaintiff's position here is that of 
Denton v. Yazo·o & M. V. R. Co., 284 U.S. 305, 52 S. Ct. 
141, 142, wherein a United States railway postal clerk 
sustained injury due to the alleged negligence of one 
Hunter, a porter, in the general service of the two rail-
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road companies who were parties defendant. Hunter was 
hired and paid by one of the defendant railroad.., and at 
the time of the injury he was engaged in loading United 
States mail into a mail car under the direction of a 
United States postal transfer clerk, and was not as to 
that work under the direction or control of either of the 
railroad companies. A judgment and verdict was render-
ed against the two defendant companies and this judg-
ment was reversed by the Supreme Court of Mississippi 
and of the United State;s on the ground that Hunter at 
the time of the alleged negligence was not working for 
defendants, but for the United States. The United States 
court stated : 
''Whether the railroad companies may be 
held liable for Hunter's act depends not upon 
the fact that he was their servant generally, but 
upon whether the work which he was doing at 
the time was their work or that of another; a 
question determined, usually at least, by ascer-
taining under whose authority and command the 
work was being done. When one person puts his 
servant at the disposal and under the control of 
another for the performance of a particular ser-
vice for the latter, the servant, in respect of his 
acts in that service, is to be dealt with as the ser-
vant of the latter and not of the former. This 
rule is elementary and finds support in a large 
number of decision;s, a few only of which need be 
cited.'' 
"The statutory obligation imposed upon the 
railroad carriers is simply to transport mail of-
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fered for transportation by the United States. 
They are not required to handle, load, or receive 
mail matter, but only to furnish the men necessary 
for those purposes. The men so furnished handle 
the mails and load them into, and receive them 
from, the railway post office cars, as the regula-
tion prescribes, 'under the direction of the trans-
fer clerk, or clerk in charge of the car.' The work 
they do is that of the government. It is said that 
'direction' means nothing more than the right 
to point out or indicate to the men furnished the 
disposition to be made of the mail. The scope of 
the word, as it is here used, is not to be thus 
limited. The phrase, 'under the direction of the 
transfer clerk,' would be practically meaningless 
unless it comprehended the power to supervise 
and control the movement. Obviously, as the evi-
dence shows, a direction by the transfer clerk 
carries with it the duty, on the part of the men 
directed, to obey, and has, and was intended to 
have, the force. of a command.'' 
Hence, in the Denbon case the court determined that 
the employee was an employee not of the one hiring and 
paying his wages, but of the United States Government, 
for whom he was performing services at the time of his 
negligence. 
iSee the following cases which support the conten-
tion of plaintiff that at the time of his injuries he was 
an employee of the defendant railroad company: LoveU 
v. Calloway, 69 F. (2d) 532; Chioago R.I. & P. Ry. Co. 
v. Norman, 165 Okla. 133, 25 P. (2d) 298; Atlantic Coast 
LineR. Co. v. Tred!way's Adm'x., 120 Va. 735, 93 S. E. 
560, 10 A.L.R. 1411 (writ of cert. den. 245 U. S. 670, 38 
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S. Ct. 191, 62 L. Ed. 540) ; McLamb v. E. I. Du Pont De 
Nemours, 79 F. (2d) 966; H·arrell v. Atlas Po·rt.lam,d Ce-
ment Co., 250 F. 83. 
The Utah Supreme Court has had occasion to con-
sider some of the foregoing authorities in the case of 
Murra;y v. Wasatch Grading Oo., 73 Utah 430, 438, 274 
P. 940. In that case the court ·atated: 
'' * * * The adjudicated cases affecting the 
principles of the common law that determine 
when the relation of master and servant exists 
consider five elements: ( 1) The selection and em-
ployment of the servant; (2) the payment of the 
servant's wages; (3) the power to discharge the 
servant; ( 4) the power to control the servant's 
action.:;; and ( 5) the person whose work is being 
done by the servant. It is quite generally held that 
the first three elements above enumerated are not 
necessary to the existence of the relationship of 
master and servant. 37 L.R.A. note pages 38 to 
43; 1 Labatt, Mast. & Servt. (2d Ed.) pp. 56 to 
58. As stated by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the case of Standard Oil Co. v. Ander-
son, 212 U. S. 215, 29 S. Ct. 252, 53 L. Ed. 480: 
'In many of the cases the power of substitution 
or discharge, the payment of wages and other 
circumstances bearing upon the relation are 
dwelt upon. They, however, are not the ultimate 
facts, but only those more or less useful in de-
termining whose is the work and whose is the 
power of control.' '' 
There are three recently decided Federal Circuit 
Court cases which support the position of the plaintiff 
in the case at bar. Each of these cases was brought under 
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the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and in each case 
the injured person had been employed by a person other 
than the railroad company. In each instance, the plain-
tiff contended that he was in the special employment of 
the railroad company and hence could bring his action 
under the F.E.L.A. The defendant railroad company 
in each case, as is true in the case at bar, contended 
that the plaintiff was not an employee of the railroad 
company, but in fact was the employee of the person 
hiring him. These cases are Cimorelli v. New York Oent,. 
R. Co., 1-!8 F. (2d) 575, Penn;.stylvarnia R. Co. v. Roth, 
163 F. (2d) 161, and Penrnsylvania R. Co. v. BMlion, 172 
F. (2d) 710. 
In the Cimorelli case the defendant railroad com-
pany had entered into a contract with the United States 
whereby the company agreed to equip, maintain and 
operate in its yards at Dock Junction, Pennsylvania, a 
temporary storage place for war material in transit. The 
material was to be unloaded from cars, placed in open air 
storage and so kept that the contents of each car could 
be reloaded and moved to points of destination under 
the original waybill and bill of lading. The defendant 
company was to be paid for its services sums in addition 
to the ordinary transportation charges and was also to be 
reimbursed for its cost in preparing, equiping and main-
taining the storage yards. 
The defendant company contracted with the Duffy 
Construction Company for the unloading and reloading 
of the cars in a proper and orderly condition and at such 
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places in the defendant's yard as were selected by its 
superintendent. The Duffy Company was required to 
furnish its own equipment and labor and it was to per-
form the work promptly at such times and to such ex-
tent as was reasonably required by the defendant's super-
intendent. 
The defendant agreed to put the cars for unloading 
and reloading at such places in the yard as would be 
reasonably convenient for the Duffy Company. The 
Duffy Company was to be paid for its services all of its 
cost of the work and in addition seven cents per ton. 
This additional amount was in no event to exceed ten 
per cent of the cost of performing the work. ·The allow-
able cost items were enumerated in the contract and no 
part of them was payable unless approved by the .super-
intendent. The contract required the Duffy Company 
to keep accurate accounts and to submit copies thereof 
to the defendant company. The purchase of all hand 
tools, materials and supplies were to be approved in 
advance by the defendant and the title to such property 
was to be vested in defendant. 
There was a special provision in the contract that 
the Duffy Company was to perform the work as an in-
dependent contractor with exclusive supervision of the 
manner and method of the performance of the work ex-
cept that it was to be satisfactory to the defendant. 
The plaintiff was employed by the Duffy Company 
to perform some of the unloading services required by 
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the contract. Plaintiff contended that due to the negli-
gence of the defendant he was severely injured while 
unloading freig·ht from a boxcar stationed on defendant's 
out-door storage track. Plaintiff contended that he was 
employed by the defendant. This latter contention was 
denied by the defendant. The question of whether or not 
the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant was sub-
mitted for determination by the trial court at the time 
of the pretrial hearing. The two contracts above men-
tioned were submitted to the court and the trial court de-
termined that at the time of the injuries the plaintiff was 
not employed by the defendant company and his action 
was dismissed. From this dismissal plaintiff appealed 
to the circuit court. The circuit court reversed. It 
quoted from the Federal Employers' Liability Act as 
follows: 
'' * * * every common carrier by railroad* * =ll' 
shall be liable in damages to any person suffer-
ing injury while he is employed by such carrier.'' 
The circuit court held that the words used in this sec-
tion are to be construed in their natural sense and that 
they describe the conventional relationship of employer 
and employee. 
The court also stated at p. 577 : 
'' * * * And so the first question here is 
whether appellee, for whom the work was being 
done, had given up its proprietorship of the par-
ticular business to the Duffy Construction Com-
pany and had thus divested itself of the right of 
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control, to the extent that it had no longer a legal 
right to terminate the work or to direct it. If 
appellee had done nothing to limit its rights with 
regard to the business which was being done for 
its benefit, but had retained its proprietorship 
of it, each person working for the Duffy Construc-
tion Company was legally subject to appellee's 
control while so engaged and was the employee 
of appellee. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 
518, 10 S. Ct. 175, 33 L. Ed. 440; The Standard 
Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U. S. 215, 29 S. Ct. 252, 
53 L. Ed. 480.'' 
The court recognized the difficulty of the problem 
involved and stated that each case must be decided on 
its own peculiar facts and ordinarily no one feature 
of the relationship is determinative. The court then set 
forth various testa which have been used in determining 
whether or not the relationship of an employer and em-
ployee existed, as follows : 
'' * * * One of the teats is who has the right 
of control over the work being done. Other recog-
nized tests are the existence -of a contract for the 
performance by a person of a certain piece or 
kind of work at a fixed price, the independent 
nature of the contractor's business, his employ-
ment of assistants with the right to supervise 
their activities, his obligation to furnish neces-
aary tools, supplies and materials, his right to 
control the progress of the work except as to final 
results, the time for which the workmen are em-
ployed, the method of payment, whether by time 
or job, and whether the work is part of the regu-
lar business of the employer. The important test 
is the control over the details of the work re-
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served by the employer and to what extent the 
person doing the work is in fact independent in 
its performance. Restatement of the law of 
Agency, Y ol. 1, p. 483, ch. 7, Sec. 220. '' 
The circuit court held that the plaintiff was em-
ployed by the defendant railroad company within the 
meaning of the F.E.L.A. The court placed emphasis on 
the fact that the defendant's superintendent selected 
the place in the yards where, and fixed the time when, 
the cars were either unloaded or reloaded. The court 
pointed out that the part of the work to be done by 
Duffy was in the railroad yards of defendant where 
there was presumably a frequent movement of cars and 
the defendant controlled the place where the work wa.s 
to be performed. No part of these premises were sur-
rendered to Duffy. The court also pointed out that the 
whole project involved many interdependent details, the 
control of any one of which could not be surrendered 
without disorganization of the whole. From the very 
nature of the work its performance could not be com-
mitted exclusively to the discretion of the Duffy Com-
pany. 
There were other factors taken into consideration 
by the court, but the foregoing are certainly things or 
factors which are present in the case at bar. The rail-
road company here continued to control the yards and 
did not turn over the control of the tracks to the express 
company. The place where the work was to be performed 
was determined by the defendant company. The time 
that it was to be performed was fixed by the railroad 
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company. It was necessary in the instance involved in 
the case at bar for the plaintiff to work rapidly upon 
the train because it was a manifest freight and should 
leave the yard in five or six minutes not for the benefit 
of the express company, but obviously for the railroad 
company'a Time-Table. 
In Pe'ft.nSylv~ R. Co. v. Roth, supra, the defend-
ant railroad company had entered into a contract with 
the United States Government wherein it agreed to 
provide certain storage yards on the line of its railroad 
and to furnish necessary labor and material for the 
loading and unloading of cars. The railroad company 
in turn entered into a contract with the Fritz-Rumer-
Cook Company. Under this contract this latter company 
was to unload inbound cars, assemble and place the 
material, remove the material from the inbound cars 
and recondition it. The company was also to do certain 
atenciling and marking in ·the storage yards. Under the 
terms of this contract the defendant was to pay the 
contracting company on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis, based 
upon monthly statements submitted to and certified by 
the division engineer of the defendant railroad company. 
Inside the storage yards the work of loading and 
unloading government rna terial was carried on by the 
contractor's employees under the superviaion of its yard 
foreman. This foreman hired and fired the men who 
worked there, directed the railroad company's switch 
engines which entered the yard as to where to place 
and pick up cars for loading and unloading, and super-
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vised the work. The contracting company's foreman 
supervised the loading of material and directed its 
moYement out of the yard. 
The plaintiff was employed by the contracting com-
pany and the work he did was in the storage yard cov:.. 
ered by the contract between the defendant railroad 
company and the contracting company. 
On the occasion on which he wa.s injured, the con-
tractor was loading on to a flat car a large crane owned 
by it and which had been used by it in its operations 
under the contract with the defendant company. A car 
inspector for the defendant explained to the contractor's 
foreman the manner in which the car must be loaded 
in order to comply with the regulations of the Associ-
ation of American Railroads and to be acceptable for 
transportation by defendant. This car inspector was 
present while the loading was taking place, and made 
sugge.stions as to how the crane should be fastened. 
The physical work was being done by two employees 
of the contractor. The plaintiff was standing on the 
ground beside the car, and he testified that defendant's 
car inspector asked him to hold one of the cross-ties 
down, and after he had complied with the direction, the 
car inspector told him to leave it there. Plaintiff there-
upon let loose of the bar and started to step away from 
the car. The other employees also let go of the bar and 
it slipped and in a twirling motion hit plaintiff just 
underneath the eye causing serious damage. 
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Plaintiff alleged in his first cause of action that he 
was an employee of the railroad company and that he 
was injured by reason of the negligence of the car in-
spector of the defendant. In his second cause of action 
he alleged that if he was not employed by the defendant 
railroad company, then he was entitled to recover on 
the theory of negligence by the defendant toward an 
invitee upon the premises. The trial judge permitted 
the case to go to the jury under the first cause of action, 
holding as matter of law that the plaintiff was an em-
ployee of the railroad company. The jury returned a 
verdict in favor of plaintiff and defendant appealed. 
The circuit court affirmed plaintiff's judgment, relying 
upon the Cimorelli case and concluded that the follow-
ing matters were the controlling factors in that case, 
at p. 164: 
'' * * *In its overall estimate of the control-
ling facts in that case, it was pointed out that 
the employment of the contractor was general, 
that the number of cars to be unloaded or re-
loaded depended upon the demands of the busi-
ness, that the work was to be done when, where 
and in the proportions as the needs of the Rail-
road Company might justify, that the .Railroad 
Company controlled the place where the work 
was to be performed and in which there was a 
frequent movement of cars, and that no part of 
the premises was surrendered to the contractor. 
The opinion then stated-' The whole project in-
volved many interdependent details, the control 
of any one of which could not be surrendered 
without disorganization of the whole. From the 
very nature of the work its performance could 
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not be committed exclusively to the discretion of 
the Duffy Company.' It then ruled that taking 
into consideration the circumstances surrounding 
the parties, the subject matter of the contract and 
the object intended to be accomplished by its 
performance, it was not the purpose of the parties 
that the work should be performed by the Con-
struction Company as an independent con-
tractor." 
These two cases were then followed by the Barlion 
case, supra. The same railroad was the defendant as 
in the Roth case. The same contract with the govern-
ment was involved and the same type of contract had 
been made with contractor as in the R:o'th case. The 
plaintiff was an employee of that contractor. Plaintiff 
brought his action under the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act contending that he was the employee of the 
railroad company and that he had been injured by its 
negligence. The defendant contended that he in fact 
was an employee of the contractor and that there was 
no liability on the part of the defendant for the injuries 
plaintiff received. In referring to the two pr·evious 
cases the court at p. 712, pointed out the controlling facts 
and stated as follows, referring in particular to the 
Cimorelli case : 
" * * * that the court, in its over-all, esti-
mate of the controlling facts in the latter case, 
pointed out that the employment of the contrac-
tor was general, that the number of cars to be 
unloaded or reloaded depended upon the demands 
of the business, that the work was to be done 
when, where, and in the proportions as the needs 
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of the railroad company might justify, that the 
railroad company controlled the place where the 
work was to be performed and in which there 
was a frequent movement of cars, and that no 
part of the premises was surrendered to the con-
tractor. It was further said that the whole project 
involved many interdependent details, the con-
trol or any one of which could not be surrendered 
without disorganization of the whole, and that, 
from the nature of the work, its performance 
could not be committed exclusively by the rail-
road to the contractor engaged in doing the un-
loading and reloading work and rendering the 
other -services in question. The railroad had this 
right of control in the instant case to the same 
extent as it did in the Roth case; and it is the 
right of control, rather than its exercise, that 
determines whether or not a contractor is an in-
dependent contractor. The Roth case, therefore, 
cannot be distinguished on the ground that the 
control of the railroad company was there exer-
cised, whereas it was not exercised in the present 
case.'' 
When we consider these three cases in their appli-
cation to the present case, it at once becomes apparent 
that these authorities require a holding that the plain-
tiff was an employee of the defendant railroad company. 
In the case at bar the number of cars to be inspected 
and heaters regulated depended upon the demands of 
the railroad company's business; the work to be done 
by plaintiff and other express company employees was 
to be done when, where and in the proportions as the 
needs of the railroad company mi_ght justify. The rail-
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road company here controlled the place where the work 
was to be performed and in these yards there was a 
frequent movement of cars and certainly no part of 
these pren1ises was surrendered to the express company .. 
In the case at bar the whole project was readying trains 
in the yards of the railroad company for further inter-
state movements and involved many interdependent de-
tails, such as the switching and servicing of the cars and 
the speed with which the work had to be done in order 
that the trains could be put in movement aa soon as 
possible. 
The railroad company in this case not only had the 
right to .supervise the work being done by plaintiff, but 
also actually directed the work to be done by plaintiff 
as evidenced by the switch list, Exhibit "5", which was 
given to the express company employees to further the 
business of the railroad company as a common carrier 
by railroad in interstate commerce. 
The defendants, in arguing the motion for a non-
suit, relied heavily upon the case of Gaulden v. Southern 
Rae. Co., 78 F. Supp. 651, affirmed without opinion 174 
F. (2d) 1022. In that case the plaintiff brought an ac-
tion under the Federal Employers' Liability Act against 
the Southern Pacific Company and the Pacific Fruit 
Express Company. Plaintiff, at the time of his injury, 
was employed as an iceman in the ice yard and plant 
owned and operated by the Pacific Fruit Express Com-
pany at Bakersfield, California. He and fellow employ-
ees were engaged in unloading ice from a refrigeration 
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car belonging to the express company. While he was 
aiding in moving an empty car from a loading platform, 
the wheels of a loaded car, which were being drawn 
to the platform by a cable and winch, struck and injured 
him. In that case the contract between the two defendant 
companies was introduced in evidence. In the case at 
bar, we have no such contract. In the G.aulden case it 
appeared that the express company owned the ice ·yard 
at Bakersfield where plaintiff was injured, and it further 
appeared that service is provided from that plant to 
the Southern Pacific Company and two other common 
carriers as well. The court clearly recognized that it 
could not be determined from the foregoing facts that 
the plaintiff was rendering any services for the Southern 
Pacific Company. That court stated at p. 656: 
'' * * * Assuming the existence of an agency 
relationship between Pacific Fruit Express Com-
pany and the Southern Pacific Company, never-
theless nothing of record indicates that plaintiff 
was injured while pursuing activities related to 
the alleged agency relationship between the two 
defendants. The Pacific Fruit Express Company 
performed refrigeration services at Bakersfield in 
addition to those covered by the contract of July 
1, 1942. It also served the Atchison, Topeka and 
Santa Fe Ry. and the Sunset Railway. The event-
ual destination of the ice which plaintiff was help-
ing to unload at the time of his injury was neither 
known or foreseen at the time. Thus nothing in 
the record indicates that the plaintiff was injured 
while employed in the service of his master's 
master.'' 
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In the case at bar, plaintiff was not performing 
services in the express company ice yards or ice house; 
he was performing services in the yards and on the 
tracks of the defendant railroad company. The defend-
ant railroad company was the only railroad company 
involved in this case. It appears conclusively that the 
services rendered by plaintiff were for the exclusive 
benefit of the defendant railroad company. Hence, the 
Gaulden case is not authority for the defendant railroad 
company in the case at bar under this point of plaintiff's 
brief. 
We submit that plaintiff was performing the work 
of the defendant railroad company at the time of his 
injury and that under the foregoing authorities he was 
in the employ of the defendant railroad company and 
hence could properly maintain his action against that 
company under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 
POINT II 
THE ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY DEFENDANT RAIL-
ROAD COMPANY SEEKS TO HAVE EMPLOYEES OF THE 
EXPRESS COMPANY AND NOT ITS OWN EMPLOYEES 
PERFORM NECESSARY SERVICES ON ITS INTERSTATE 
TRAINS AND CARS IS A CONTRACT OR DEVICE IN VIO-
LATION OF 45 U.S.C.A., SECTION 55. 
Another reason why defendant cannot escape lia-
bility under the F.E.L.A. for plaintiff's injuries is be-
cause the arrangement whereby employees of another 
company perform necessary services on its trains and 
cars is a contract or device, the purpose and intent of 
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which is to enable the defendant railroad company as a 
common carrier to exempt itself from liability created 
by that act. 
45 U.S.C.A., Sec. 55, in so far as material here, 
pr-ovides: 
''Any contract, rule, regulation, or device 
whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall 
be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself 
from any liability created by this chapter, shall 
to that extent be void." 
The defendant express company is a corporation 
organized under the laws of Utah in 1906. The stock 
of that company, with the exception of a relatively small 
number of shares, is owned in equal amounts by the 
defendant railroad company and the Southern Pacific 
Company, the latter being a railroad company (R. 266). 
Under the contentions of the defendant railroad 
company it has the employees of a company, of which 
it owns approximately one-half of the stock, perform 
services on its interstate trains and since those employ-
ees are not its employees it thereby avoids any liabilities 
to them under the F.E.L.A. 
Assume that there was a corporation known as The 
Switching Company, the employees of which performed 
all of the necessary switching operations on interstate 
trains of the defendant railroad company at Laramie. 
The switch list would be forwarded to the Laramie yard 
office by employees of the defendant railroad company. 
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This list would then be given to the clerk of The Switch-
ing Company in the yard office who would forward the 
information contained therein to the company's yard 
foreman. He would direct The Switching Company's 
employees to cut certain cars out of the train and put 
other cars in the train. After this operation was com-
pleted the defendant railroad company would again start 
its train on its interstate journey. Under this arrange-
ment with The Switching Company, and in accordance 
with the contention of the defendant railroad company 
in this case, the railroad company wouid be relieved 
of all liability for injuries through negligence to em-
ployees of The Switching Company. 
If the imagination of the officials of the railroad 
company could devise enough companies to cover the 
operationB necessary to conduct its business, it would 
soon be freed of all liability under the Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act. If its contention can be sustained in 
this case, then there is no reason why it cannot continue 
the formation of such companies to take over the vari-
ous operations of a common carrier by railroad in inter-
state commerce. 
We submit that if it may eliminate as employees 
persons who .service and regulate refrigerator cars in 
its interstate trains then by a parity of reasoning it may 
eliminate switchmen, brakemen, enginemen, car repair-
men, etc. 
The services performed by plaintiff and other ex-
press company employees in servicing and regulating 
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heaters ori refrigerator cars must be considered a neces-
sary service on the railroad company'·s interstate trains. 
The railroad company as a common carrier had under-
taken to transport perishable commodities. These re-
quired, in order to be safely transported, that the cars 
in which they were contained be maintained at temper-
atures which would prevent freezing and· resulting in-
jury to those commodities. These services were as neces-
sary to plaintiff's operations as the services performed 
by the switchmen in cutting cars in and out of the rail-
road company's interstate trains. These services were 
part and parcel of the railroad company's operations 
as a common carrier. 
In Gaulden v. Sout.he.rn Pac. Co., supra, the court 
held that a somewhat similar arrangement did not vio-
late 45 U.S.C.A., Sec. 55. It did so on the basis that the 
express company was organized to commence business 
before the enactment of the F .E.L.A.; it acquired none 
of its operating facilities from the railroad company; 
that the express company operated under its own man-
agement, with its own facilities and employees, and· that 
the express company served other carriers in addition 
to the defendant railroad company. We submit that none 
of these reasons should ·permit the ·railroad company to 
avoid liability under the F.E.L.A. 'The principal reason 
suggested by the court in holding that there was' no 
violation of this section of the act was that the express 
company had been created before the act was passed 
and therefore the contract or device could not have been 
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created with the intent and purpose of exempting the 
carrier from liability. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case 
of Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Oo. v. Schubert, 224 U. S. 
603, 32 S. Ct. 589, at 592, 56 L. Ed. 911, stated as follows: 
'' • • • that the provisions of Sec. 5 (this 
section) were intended to apply as well to exist-
ing as to future contracts and regulations of the 
described character cannot be doubted. The 
words, 'the purpose or intent of which shall be 
to enable any common carrier to exempt itself 
from any liability created by this act,' do not 
refer simply to an actual intent of the parties to 
circumvent the statute. The 'purpose or intent' 
of the contracts and regulations, within the mean-
ing of the section, ia to be found in their neces-
sary operation and effect in defeating the liability 
which the statute was designed to enforce. Only 
by such general application could the statute 
accomplish the object which it is plain that Con-
gress had in view. Nor can the further conten-
tion be sustained that, if so construed, the section 
is invalid. The power of Congress, in ita regula-
tion of interstate commerce, and of commerce in 
the District of Columbia and in the territories, to 
impose this liability, was not fettered by the 
necessity of maintaining existing arrangements 
and stipulations which would conflict with the exe-
cution of its policy. To subordinate the exercise 
of the federal authority to the continuing oper-
ation of previous contracta, would be to place, to 
this extent, the regulation of interstate commerce 
in the hands of private individuals and to with-
draw from the control of Congress so much of the 
field as they might choose by prophetic discern-
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ment to bring within the range of their agree-
ments. The Constitution recognizes no such lim-
itation. It is of the essence of the delegated power 
of regulation that, within its .sphere, Congress 
should be able to establish uniform rules, immedi-
ately obligatory, which as to future action should 
transcend all inconsistent provisions. Prior ar-
rangements were necessarily subject to this para-
mount authority.' '' 
We submit that under the contentions of the defend-
ant railroad company the arrangement between it and 
the express company circumvents th'e statute and its nec-
essary operation and effect defeats the liability which 
that statute was designed to enforce. Such arrangement 
is declared by the statute to be void and hence cannot 
protect the railroad company from its liability under 
the F.E.L.A. for the injuries sustained by plaintiff. 
POINT III. 
THE DEFENDANT EXPRESS COMPANY AT THE TIME 
OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES WAS A COMMON CARRIER 
BY RAILROAD IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE. 
In operating its business a.:; a common carrier the 
railroad company accepted for interstate transporation 
perishable freight. In order to effectively transport such 
freight it was necessary to have so-called refrigerator 
cars. These cars are so constructed that the inside of 
the cars may be maintained at temperatures either higher 
or lower than the temperature outside by using either 
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ice or charcoal heaters. Proper and varying ventilation 
may be maintained by adjusting doors and bunker walls. 
The express company by furnishing these cars and 
the necessary services of inspection, regulation of heat-
ers and the proYision of ice, has become a necessary 
and integral part of the railroad company's business as 
a common carrier by railroad. Hence, the express com-
pany and the railroad company in this case were engaged 
in a joint enterprise, the purpose of which was to oper-
ate the business of a common carrier by railroad. 
We .submit that this conclusion is inescapable and 
that the plaintiff was employed in this business by both 
companies. Under such circumstances the action was 
properly brought ~gainst both of these defendants under 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 
POINT IV. 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE INTRODUCED 
IN THIS CASE TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE DE-
FENDANTS WERE NEGLIGENT AND THAT SUCH NEGLI-
GENCE CONTRIBUTED IN WHOLE OR IN PART TO THE 
INJURIES SUFFERED BY PLAINTIFF. 
In each of the motions for nonsuit the defendants 
included as grounds that there waa insufficient evidence 
of negligence and of proximate cause. Almost the entire 
argument on these motions was directed to the propo-
sitions heretofore set forth in this brief. Little or noth-
ing was said about the insufficiency of the evidence to 
establish negligence and proximate cause if this case wa.s 
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properly based upon the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act. We will discuss this matter very briefly, and if the 
defendants make substantial contention in their brief 
that the evidence of negligence and proximate cause is 
insufficient, we will file a reply brief in which we will 
more fully discuss our contentions under this point of 
our brief. 
The evidence discloses that in the wintertime some 
of the refrigerator cars on defendant's train were 
equipped with heaters to prevent the perishable freight 
from freezing. These heaters are in the small compart-
ments at the ends of the cars. These compartments are 
approximately 3 feet wide and 10 feet l<~mg. The heaters 
when burning create carbon monoxide gas, the deadly 
characteristics of which are well known. The men work-
ing in these bunkers frequently feel the effects of this 
gas. They suffer headaches and dizziness. They are 
affected by it, not while they are in the bunkers in its 
presence, but after they have come out of the bunkers 
and come in contact with fresh air. This gas is par-
ticularly dangerous because it is odorless and invisible 
and the workmen are _given no warning of its presence or 
the amount of it which is accumulated in these bunkers. 
The defendant companies certainly are chargeable with 
knowledge of the fact that such gas it~ generated by the 
burning of these heaters and with know ledge of its char-
acteristics and effect upon the men working in it. 
The defendants have promulgated a rule to protect 
the men whose duty it is to regulate these heaters. (See 
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Rule 19 d., Exhibit "4"). This rule is for their protec-
tion and had been in force and effect for many years in 
the railroad company's Laramie Yards. 
Just before the train involved in this case arrived, 
the plaintiff's foreman told him that it was coming, gave 
him the numbers of the cars and directed him to shut 
off the heaters in those cars. The foreman told plaintiff 
that the train was only to remain in the yards for five 
or six minutes and that he would have to hurry in per-
forming the duties of his employment. He was instructed 
by the foreman to open but one plug on each car. Both 
the .plaintiff and the foreman were on duty at this time, 
yet the foreman directed the plaintiff, in violation of 
the above rule, to do the necessary work on these three 
cars while he was alone. Plaintiff proceeded to the place 
where the cars were located and, after opening a plug 
on each car, he returned to the first car. He descended 
into the bunker in that car and shut off the heater. He 
did the same on the second and third cars. Since plain-
tiff was alone it was necessary for him to enter all three 
bunkers and there was no one present to assist him in 
the performance of any of his duties. He thereby was 
subjected to the carbon monoxide which had accumu-
lated in the three bunkers in which the heaters had been 
burning. Upon contacting the fresh air after being in 
the three bunkers he became unconscious. The evidence 
discloses that this would be the time when he would be 
affected by the carbon monoxide gas and is in line with 
the experience of the men who had been working where 
this gas was present. When plaintiff fell from the top 
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of the car he fell a distance of 16 feet, suffering a broken 
hip and broken ribs. 
We submit that under the well-established rules 
laid done by the Supreme Court of the United States 
this evidence furnished an evidentiary basis upon which 
a jury could find negligence on the part of the defend-
ants, or either of them, in directing the plaintiff to per-
form the duties of shutting off these heaters while he 
was alone and in telling him to hurry with his work 
because the train had to leave within five or six minutes 
and thereby subjecting him to the carbon monoxide gas 
in these bunkers without providing any means to elimin-
ate this gas from the bunkers. 
While there are no Supreme Court cases directly in 
point on a situation of this type, we submit that under 
the well known princi pies laid down by the following 
cases, the testimony here should have been submitted 
to a jury for its finding on the matter of negligence and 
proximate cause. See Bailey v. Central Vermo-nt R. Co., 
319 U. S. 350, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 87 L. Ed. 1444; Lavend.er v. 
K urn, 326 U. S. 713, 66 S. Ct. 7 40, 90 Adv. Ops. L. Ed. 
692; Wilkerson v. McOarthy, 187 P. (2d) 188, 69 S. Ct. 
29, 69 S. Ct. 413; Garay v. Southern Pacific Co., 69 S. Ct. 
275; Tewnant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Oo., 321 U. S. 29; 
64 S. Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed. 520; TilZer v. Atlantlic Coast Line 
R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ed. 610. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
59 
CONCLUSION 
\Ve respectfully submit that the trial court com-
mitted error by granting the motions for nonsuit made 
by each of the defendants in this case. Under the fore-
going authorities we submit that the court should have 
declared as matter of law that the plaintiff was an em-
ployee of each of the defendants and that the defendants 
were common carriers by railroad in interstate com-
merce. ·The trial court should have submitted the ques-
tion of the defendants' negligence and of proximate 
cause to the jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK 
& ROBERTS, 
WAYNE L. BLACK, 
DWIGHT L. KING, 
Cownsel for Plaitntiff amd Appellant. 
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